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Abstract
A Nash Equilibrium is a joint strategy prole at which
each agent myopically plays a best response to the other
agents' strategies, ignoring the possibility that deviating
from the equilibrium could lead to an avalanche of
successive changes by other agents. However, such
changes could potentially be benecial to the agent,
creating incentive to act non-myopically, so as to take
advantage of others' responses.
To study this phenomenon, we consider a non-
myopic Cournot competition, where each rm selects
whether it wants to maximize prot (as in the classi-
cal Cournot competition) or to maximize revenue (by
masquerading as a rm with zero production costs).
The key observation is that prot may actually be
higher when acting to maximize revenue, (1) which will
depress market prices, (2) which will reduce the produc-
tion of other rms, (3) which will gain market share for
the revenue maximizing rm, (4) which will, overall, in-
crease prots for the revenue maximizing rm. Implicit
in this line of thought is that one might take other rms'
responses into account when choosing a market strategy.
The Nash Equilibria of the non-myopic Cournot compe-
tition capture this action/response issue appropriately,
and this work is a step towards understanding the im-
pact of such strategic manipulative play in markets.
We study the properties of Nash Equilibria of
non-myopic Cournot competition with linear demand
functions and show existence of pure Nash Equilibria,
that simple best response dynamics will produce such an
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equilibrium, and that for some natural dynamics this
convergence is within linear time. This is in contrast
to the well known fact that best response dynamics
need not converge in the standard myopic Cournot
competition.
Furthermore, we compare the outcome of the non-
myopic Cournot competition with that of the standard
myopic Cournot competition. Not surprisingly, per-
haps, prices in the non-myopic game are lower and the
rms, in total, produce more and have a lower aggregate
utility.
1 Introduction
Understanding competition between rms is a funda-
mental problem in economics. One of the oldest and
most studied models in this area is the Cournot com-
petition [4]. In a Cournot competition there is a single
divisible good, each rm has a certain production cost
per unit to manufacture the good, and each rm must
select a quantity of the good to produce. The price is
then set as a function of the total quantity produced
by all of the rms. Naturally, as the quantity increases
the price decreases, and thus the rms face a tradeo
between the amount produced and the market price.
A major and fundamental problem with the Nash
equilibrium is that it was conceived as a solution concept
for a single shot simultaneous play game, but it is
often invoked in other contexts, where it possibly makes
less sense. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium denes a
best response to a given strategy prole of the other
agents, a i, to be the best action possible, under the
assumption that the other players will not deviate from
a i. The Cournot competition model highlights some
potential problems with treating the Nash equilibrium
as the inevitable outcome of competitive play.
Consider the following example: There are two oil
producing rms, Wildcat Drillers and W. Petroleum.
Wildcat Drillers has a production cost of $0:5 USD
per mega-barrel; W. Petroleum has a production cost
of $0:3 USD per mega-barrel. If the price per mega-
barrel decreases linearly, specically, if price = (1 - total
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supply in mega-barrels), then the Cournot competition
equilibrium price is $0:6. At this equilibrium price,
both rms are producing and no rm can benet by
unilaterally changing its production quantity, assuming
that the other rm does not change its production
quantity. (In our toy example the price drops down to
zero when the world supply is one mega-barrel of oil.)
If W. Petroleum were to increase its production
such that the price dropped below $0:5, Wildcat Drillers
would be producing at a loss. The inherent assumption
in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is that if this happened
Wildcat Drillers would indeed continue producing at
the same level as before, despite this loss, or that W.
Petroleum would never manipulate the market in this
manner. However, W. Petroleum may hypothesize that
if the price were driven down, Wildcat Drillers would
in fact cease production, rather than continuing pro-
duction at a loss. This hypothesis seems rather natu-
ral, but its predictions are not captured by traditional
Cournot-Nash equilibria.
The impetus for our work is a sense of unease
about the assumption that agents act myopically and
ignore responses to their own actions. In the context of
competition, it seems natural that rms should be able
to predict something about the behavior of other rms,
as a function of changes in pricing.
We are not the rst to feel such unease. To
quote Abreu [1], \In recent times this model [Cournot-
Nash] has been criticized for being too static, and
thereby yielding predictions which are misleadingly
competitive".
Our work follows a direction pioneered by Vickers
[13], Fershtman and Judd [6], and Sklivas [11]. The
model used in many of these papers is a xed-depth
extensive form \delegation" game: the rst stage1 is an
\owners game", and the second stage is the \managers
game". Essentially, the rst stage players (sometimes
called the owners or principals) set parameters for the
second stage players (sometimes called the Managers or
the agents). Once the owners give these parameters to
their agents, the agents are expected to compute and
play equilibria of an underlying agent game.
While the existing literature seeks to optimize in-
centives for agents so as to maximize prots, our view
of this type of multistage game is quite dierent. A
delegation game can be interpreted as a way to make
sense of o-equilibria behavior: as the principal sets the
utility for the agent, this can encode arbitrary rules for
best responses.
We consider two natural strategies for the principal:
tell the agent to maximize revenue (select action RM),
1Some papers have delegation game models with three steps.
or tell the agent to maximize prot (select action PM).
When a principal selects PM the agent simply tries to
maximize rm prots (similar to the Cournot compe-
tition). However, when a principal selects RM, the
agent ignores production costs, and attempts to maxi-
mize rm revenue. After each selecting one of these two
strategies, agents for each rm participate in a Cournot
competition, where the PM agents use their true pro-
duction costs to determine production levels and the
RM agents use a production cost of zero to decide how
much to produce. As in the standard Cournot compe-
tition, rms experience utilities as determined by their
true production costs. The major dierence between
the PM=RM game and the underlying Cournot compe-
tition is that when a principal changes its action in the
PM=RM game, it results in a change in the production
quantities of the other rms (by converging to an equi-
librium of the underlying Cournot competition).
Previous work on the delegation game has been in
the continuous case, allowing the principal to select
among convex (and even non-convex!) combinations
of revenue maximization and prot maximization; in
such settings it is easy to see that an equilibrium exists.
In our discrete, binary PM=RM model, we show that
there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium, and that
the resulting equilibrium price of the PM=RM game is
at most the Cournot competition market price and at
least half of it. On the other hand, the aggregate utility
of the rms participating in the competition might be
signicantly lower in the PM=RM game. Conceptually,
we show that in our model, strategizing about others'
responses increases competition, reduces prices, and
improves social welfare, all while reducing corporate
prots.
We are also interested in the dynamics underlying
the Cournot competition and the PM=RM game. (We
believe we are the rst to consider dynamics of the dele-
gation game.) Interestingly, a single change of strategy
in the PM=RM game may result in a dynamic cascade
of best response moves in the underlying Cournot com-
petition. For example, if W. Petroleum increases pro-
duction, then the market price will go down, and if it
goes down enough then some rms may drop out of the
market (e.g., Wildcat Drillers might stop production).
As rms drop out of the market, the total supply goes
down, and | possibly | rms that previously were not
producing anything (say, a new company called Texas
Oil) suddenly start production.2
2The dynamics described above are the dynamics of the under-
lying Cournot competition, and can be inferred as a consequence
of actions in the PM=RM game. In the PM=RM game, there may
also be meta-level cascading eects; for example, rms may move
from maximizing prot to maximizing revenue, and then, after
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We show that best response dynamics in the
PM=RM game always converge to a pure Nash equilib-
rium. We also demonstrate simple dynamics that con-
verge in a linear number of updates, and thus such an
equilibrium is polytime-computable. One could also ar-
gue that a combination of best response by principals
and regret-minimization by agents would give dynam-
ics that converge to the unique Nash Equilibrium of the
PM=RM game.
We also consider two important special cases of the
PM=RM game, in which we give a complete character-
ization of the pure Nash equilibria: (a) only two rms
in the game and (b) all rms have the same produc-
tion cost (the symmetric case). In the symmetric case
it is interesting to observe that there are non-symmetric
pure Nash equilibria. In fact, for any choice of i rms
selecting PM and m   i rms selecting RM, there is a
cost c for which this strategy prole is in equilibrium.
Except in the case of two rms, it seems that prior work
on the delegation game has been limited to studying the
symmetric case.
Related Work Cournot competition assumes a so-
called conjectural variation model, [2], i.e., the Cournot
conjectured variation is that if one rm changes its
production level then other rms will not adjust their
production level accordingly. Under this assumption,
the Cournot competition is a Nash Equilibrium; in this
setting the Nash equilibrium is sometimes referred to as
a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
As noted above, this Cournot conjectured vari-
ation is a subject of much debate and criticism in
the economics literature, with conicting conclusions.
Abreu [1] describes how the threat of punishment in
an extended game could support higher prices than the
Cournot equilibrium prices.
By contrast, Riordan [9] considers a setting with
imperfect information where rms only see the prices
they receive. In a multistage game, a rm could increase
it's output to lower the market clearing price, this causes
rival rms to think that the demand curve has shifted
down, and hence induces them to lower their outputs in
the future. Thus, the market price will be lower than
that projected by the Cournot competition prices.
Without assuming an extensive form game,
Schelling [10] suggested that one could make \a cred-
ible threat" (that one might not act to maximize prot
alone) by delegating authority, e.g., using thugs for ex-
tortion or sadists for prison guards. In general, there
are a large number of papers dealing with delegation,
other rms respond (in the PM=RM game), they may go back to
maximizing prot.
and not only for making threats. Many of these papers
give examples of market competition between rms.
The delegation games we study here come out of
work of Vickers [13], Fershtman and Judd [6], and Skli-
vas [11]. We remark that similar ideas are due to
Kurz [8], who dened a \distortion game", wherein
agents strategically misrepresent their types to a tax-
ation mechanism (in the context of the Autmann-Kurz
income distribution game).
Alternately and equivalently, one can view the dele-
gation problem as the question \What incentives should
the principal (owner) oer the agent (manager)?".
By allowing arbitrary (not necessarily implementable)
\compensation functions", Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai
[7] give a folk theorem for achieving Pareto eciency
in delegation games (this directly implies Abreu's com-
ment, without an extensive form game).
There is a strong connection between Stackelberg
equilibria and the delegation game, e.g., if only one
player strategizes in the owners' game, and the others
don't, then the strategic owner will become a Stackel-
berg leader, and the others Stackelberg followers (see
Berr [3] for this result and others, and for a large bibli-
ography).
In this paper we deal with the delegation game
in the context of competition on quantity (Cournot
competition). While many dierent types of agent
incentives have been considered, the basic literature
studies incentives of the form
  prot + (1  )  revenue 0    1 :
Also, except for 2 rms, it seems that only the sym-
metric case (wherein all rms have the same production
cost) has been studied.
The dynamics of the Cournot competition itself
have been studied at length, and it is well known that
best response dynamics do not necessarily converge [12].
However, it is known [5] that in regret minimization
the action frequencies converge to the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium.
2 The Model
2.1 Standard (Myopic) Linear Cournot Com-
petition We consider a set of m rms, M = f1; : : :mg,
producing an identical good, where rm i has produc-
tion cost ci per unit of production. Every rm chooses
a production level xi 2 [0; 1]. Let x = hx1; x2; : : : ; xmi
be the joint production levels of all m rms. The lin-
ear Cournot model we consider here assumes the market
price is a linearly decreasing function of the production
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levels, that is,
(2.1) p(x) = 1 
mX
i=1
bixi;
for strictly positive constants b1; b2; : : : ; bm. The prot
(utility) of rm i 2 M is the prot per unit of
production times the quantity produced, i.e.,
ui(x) = (p(x)  ci)  xi:
Consider a linear Cournot competition with rms
i 2 M = f1; : : : ;mg and production costs ci. A
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a joint production level,
xeq = hxeq1 ; xeq2 ; : : : ; xeqmi, where for each rm i, xeqi
maximizes the utility for rm i, given xeq i.
3 That is,
xeqi 2 argmaxxui(xeq i; x) for all 1  i  m:
The following proposition, and variants thereof, are
well known. We give the proof only for the sake of
completeness.
Proposition 2.1. Given a linear Cournot competition
of m rms with production levels xeq at Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, let N M = f1; : : : ;mg be the set of rms
with strictly positive production levels at equilibrium,
i.e., N = fi 2M j xeqi > 0g, and let n = jN j.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium has the following
characteristics:
1. For any rm i 2 N (with strictly positive produc-
tion levels), we have
(2.2) xeqi =
p(xeq)  ci
bi
:
2. The market clearing price at equilibrium is
(2.3) p(xeq) =
1 +
P
i2N c
eq
i
n+ 1
= peq(c):
3. The utility of non-producing rms (j =2 N) is zero,
and the utility of producing rms (i 2 N) is
(2.4) ui(x
eq) =
(peq(c)  ci)2
bi
:
Proof. To compute the Cournot-Nash equilibrium we
take the derivative of ui(x) = (p(x) ci)xi with respect
to xi. It follows from Equation (2.1) that
(2.5)
@
@xi
ui(x) = (p(x)  ci)  bixi:
3We denote by x i the vector x except for the i-th component,
and by (x i; a) the vector x where the i-th component is replaced
by a.
It follows from Equation (2.5) that
bix
eq
i = p(x
eq)  ci = peq(c)  ci :
Note that in equilibrium a rm i 2 M has xeqi > 0 i
ci < peq(c). Taking the sum over all the rms N  M
with strictly positive production levels we have
jN jpeq(c) 
X
j2N
cj =
X
j2N
bjx
eq
j = 1  peq(c) ;
where the second equality follows from the denition
of the market price in a linear Cournot competition
(Equation (2.1)). This implies that the market clearing
price at equilibrium is
p(xeq) = peq(c) =
1 +
P
j2N cj
n+ 1
:
Thus, the utility of a rm i 2 N , at equilibrium, is
(peq(c)  ci)  xeqi = (peq(c)  ci)2=bi.
2.2 The PM=RM Game To address the issue that
actions of one rm may impact the actions of another,
resulting in an outcome other than a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, we study a binary delegation game, which
we refer to as the PM=RM game. In the game, a rm's
principal selects between two strategies for its agent:
1. PM (prot maximization), and
2. RM (revenue maximization).
In this PM=RM game, as in the Cournot competi-
tion, we have a set ofM rms f1; : : :mg, and each rm i
has a production cost ci. Each rm has a principal that
selects an action in fPM;RMg; for simplicity, we will at-
tribute both the action and the resulting utility to the
rm itself. Let g(c;RM) = 0 and g(c;PM) = c. Given
a joint action z 2 fPM;RMgm, we dene a virtual cost
vector y(z) such that yi(z) = g(ci; zi).
Eectively, the principal determines a virtual cost,
which could be either the true production cost or zero.
In both cases, the agent takes this virtual production
cost and chooses a production level corresponding to
that production cost in the standard Cournot competi-
tion. When production costs are zero, prot and rev-
enue are identical, and thus we can consider such an
action as revenue maximizing.
We now consider the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of
this virtual Cournot competition, played with virtual
production costs yi(z) = g(ci; zi) rather than ci. For
this Cournot-Nash equilibrium we have production lev-
els xeq(y(z)), and price peq(y(z)). It follows from Equa-
tion (2.2) that the production levels derived from the
virtual Cournot competition are as follows:
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1. If rm i chooses prot maximization (PM) then the
production level is xeqi (y(z)) = (peq(y(z))  ci)=bi.4
2. If rm i chooses revenue maximization (RM)
then the production level xeq(z) = xeqi (y(z)) =
peq(z)=bi.
Similar to the state of aairs for a (myopic) Cournot
competition, the utility of rm i 2 M in the PM=RM
game is ui(z) = (peq(z)   ci)xi(z). Note that a rm's
utility in the PM=RM game is determined using the true
production costs, not the virtual production costs.
In this model, market prices will always be positive,
i.e., peq(z)  0. Similarly, the production level of any
rm is always non-negative: xi  0; 8i. Let Neq(z)
be the set of rms with strictly positive production
levels, given the joint action z of the PM=RM game.
Let PM(z) be set of PM players with strictly positive
production levels at joint action z, PM(z) = fr : zr =
PM; cr < peq(z)g, and let RM(z) be set of RM players
at z, RM(z) = fr : zr = RMg.
A principal i that selects zi = PM is guaranteed
a non-negative utility for his rm: Either it does not
produce (xi(z) = 0) or it produces (xi(z) = (peq(y(z)) 
ci)=bi > 0), and in both cases ui(z) = bix
2
i (z). A
principal that chooses to maximize revenue always has
strictly positive rm production level, and the rm
may nd itself with negative utility. However, in the
equilibria of the PM=RM game, all rms have non-
negative utility (since all principals always have the
option of playing PM).
We dene the best response correspondence of a
rm i as BRi(z i) to include all the best response
actions, given that the other rms' actions are z i.
Since we have only two actions, we sometimes abuse the
notation and talk about the best response action, when
it is unique. A best response sequence is a sequence of
joint actions z1; : : : ; zk, in which each joint action zj+1
is derived from the preceding joint action zj by a single
rm making a best response move.
3 Nash Equilibria and Dynamics of the PM=RM
game
In this section, we study the properties of the PM=RM
game and establish the existence of pure Nash equilibria.
3.1 Market price vs. Production cost The next
lemma plays an essential role in understanding the
structure of Nash equilibria of the PM=RM game. It
4As y(z) is a function of z we will use the notation p(z)
and p(y(z)) interchangeably, and do likewise for arbitrary other
functions of y(z).
states that when a rm switches from revenue max-
imization to prot maximization, the price increases
(and therefore the number of producing rms cannot
decrease so long as the switching rm continues pro-
duction).
Lemma 3.1. Let z i be a joint action of all rms except
of some rm i, and consider the two joint actions zpm =
(z i;PM) and zrm = (z i;RM) in which rm i has
action PM and RM, respectively. Let npm = jN(zpm)j
and nrm = jN(zrm)j denote the number of producing
rms in the two joint actions and let the corresponding
market prices be ppm = peq(z
pm) and prm = peq(z
rm).
Then
1. ppm > prm, and
2. if rm i produces at zpm, then npm  nrm.
Proof. For Claim 1, we can derive ppm from prm by
doing the computation in two stages. In the rst stage,
we consider the increase in the price as rm i changes
its action from RM to PM while the other rms do not
react; in the second stage, the other rms react to the
price change and the price drops. We will argue that
the price will stay above the original level.
In the rst stage, after rm i changes from RM
to PM, the price increases regardless of whether rm
i keeps producing or stops producing. Specically, if it
keeps producing, the price increases by ci1+nrm , and if it
stops producing, the number of producers decreases by
1, and the price increases by a factor of 1+nrmnrm .
In the second phase, some rms that were not
producing at price prm start producing. This aects
the price by increasing the numerator by the sum of the
production costs of the new producers; the denominator
increases by the number of new producers. The crucial
observation is that the new producers have production
cost at least prm (since they were not producing at this
price). It follows that the changes in the numerator and
the denominator of the price will leave the price above
prm.
Claim 2 follows directly from Claim 1: Since the
price goes up, every rm who produces before the
change keeps producing after the price increase; the only
exception may be rm i which changed its strategy to
PM, but the premise is that rm i produces.
The next lemma bounds the eect on the price when
a rm switches from PM to RM.
Lemma 3.2. With the same premises of Lemma 3.1 and
the additional assumption that rm i produces at zpm,
we have
prm +
ci
1 + npm
 ppm  prm + ci
1 + nrm
:
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Proof. Let C =
P
y2PM(zrm) cy and C
0 =P
y2PM(zpm) cy. By the premise of the lemma,
i 2 PM(zpm), hence ci is one of the terms in C 0. The
dierence C 0 C  ci is the sum of the production costs
of the rms that start producing when i switches from
RM to PM. There are (npm   nrm) such rms, which
by the previous lemma is non-negative. Since each of
these rms has production cost between prm and ppm,
we have
(npm   nrm)prm  C 0   C   ci  (npm   nrm)ppm
According to the denition of peq(z) we have:
prm =
1 + C
1 + nrm
; ppm =
1 + C 0
1 + npm
:
Combining these two equations, we have
ppm(1 + npm)  prm(1 + nrm) = C 0   C ;
which implies that
ci + (npm   nrm)prm  ppm(1 + npm)  prm(1 + nrm)
 ci + (npm   nrm)ppm;
and the lemma follows.
Lemma 3.3. With the premises of Lemma 3.2 and the
extra assumption that ci  prm:
1. If rm i prefers PM to RM, then
ci  prm

1  1
n2rm

:
2. If rm i prefers RM to PM, then
ci  prm

1  1
n2pm

:
Proof. The utilities of rm i in zpm and zrm are
ui(z
pm) = 1bi (ppm ci)2 and ui(zrm) = 1bi prm(prm ci).
If rm i prefers PM to RM, we have ui(z
pm)  ui(zrm),
prm
bi
(prm   ci)  1
bi
(ppm   ci)2;
prm(prm   ci)  (ppm   ci)2;(3.6)
prm(prm   ci)  (prm + ci
1 + nrm
  ci)2;(3.7)
where inequality (3.7) follows from inequality (3.6)
using Lemma 3.2 and the fact that the terms in the
right-hand side inside the square are non-negative; this
follows immediately from the premise of the lemma
that rm i produces at zpm. By simplifying the last
inequality, we get the rst part of the lemma.
The second part is similar. Since rm i prefers RM
to PM, we have ui(z
pm)  ui(zrm). Therefore
(prm   ci)prm
bi
>
(ppm   ci)2
bi
;
(prm   ci)prm > (ppm   ci)2;(3.8)
(prm   ci)prm > (prm + ci
1 + npm
  ci)2;(3.9)
where inequality (3.9) follows from inequality (3.8)
using Lemma 3.2. Again, the right-hand side terms
inside the squares are positive, and this is guaranteed by
the extra assumption that ci  prm. The last inequality
is equivalent to the second inequality of the lemma.
3.2 Existence of pure Nash Equilibrium We rst
relate the price after the best response move to the cost
of the rms.
Observation 3.1. Consider rms i and j with produc-
tion costs ci > cj. Consider a joint action z where
zi = zj = RM. Let p
0 be the price if j changes to PM
from z, let p00 be the price if i changes to PM from z.
Then, p0  p00.
Proof. We argue that p0  p00. One can view the cost
change of rm i in two stages. In the rst stage it
increases its cost by cj , thus setting price p
0 in the
system (it can be the case that i does not produce at p0).
In the second stage, rm i completes its cost change by
increasing it by the remaining ci cj (in the case where i
does not produce after the rst stage, we have p00 = p0).
Since the price is monotone in the cost, we get p0  p00.
We now show that if rm j prefers to switch from
RM to PM in the joint action z, then any rm i with
higher production cost that plays RM in z would also
prefer to switch to PM.
Lemma 3.4. Consider rms i and j with production
costs ci > cj. Consider a joint action z where zi = zj =
RM. If in z rm j prefers PM, i.e., BRj(z j) = PM,
then rm i also prefers PM, i.e., BRj(z i) = PM. (See
Figure 1(a).)
Proof. Let p = peq(z). If ci > p, then clearly i prefers
PM (since it has a negative utility when playing RM).
For the rest of the proof we assume that ci  p.
Consider joint actions z0 = (z j ;PM), z00 = (z i;PM)
with market prices p0 and p00, respectively. The utility
of rm j in joint action z is uj(z) = p(p   cj)=bj ,
and the utility of rm j in joint action z0 is uj(z0) =
(p0   cj)2=bj . The utility of rm i in joint action z is
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ui(z) = p(p   ci)=bi and the utility of rm i in joint
action z00 is ui(z00) = (p00   ci)2=bi. By assumption, j
prefers to switch to PM when the joint action is z, so
uj(z) < uj(z
0), i.e.,
(3.10) p(p  cj)=bj < (p0   cj)2=bj ;
and we wish to show that ui(z) < ui(z
0), i.e.,
(3.11) p(p  ci)=bi < (p00   ci)2=bi :
Let n; n0; n00 be the number of rms with non-zero
production levels in z; z0; z00, respectively.
Using Lemma 3.3, since j prefers PM, we have
cj > p(1  1n2 ).
For xed p and p0, dene f(r) = (p0 r)2 p(p r).
Rearranging equation (3.10), we have f(cj) > 0. We
will complete the proof by showing that f(r) is an
increasing function in the range r > p(1   1n2 ). Given
that, since ci > cj > p(1   1n2 ) and f(cj) > 0, we
will conclude f(ci) > 0, and thus p(p  ci) < (p0   ci)2.
Finally, from Observation 3.1 we have p0  p00 and hence
p(p  ci) < (p00   ci)2, which will complete the proof.
We now show that f is increasing in the desired
range. The derivative of f is f 0(r) = 2(r p0)+p. From
Lemma 3.2, p0  p+ cj1+n . For r  cj we get
f 0(r)  2r   2(p+ r
1 + n
) + p
= 2r
n
n+ 1
  p
 2p

1  1
n2

n
n+ 1
  p
 p(2n  2
n
  1)
= p
n  2
n
 0 :
We now show that if rm i prefers to switch from
PM to RM in the common action z, then any rm j
with lower production cost that plays PM in z would
also prefer to switch to RM.
Lemma 3.5. Consider rms i and j with production
costs ci > cj. Suppose zi = zj = PM. If in joint
action z rm i prefers RM, i.e., BRj(z i) = RM, then
rm j would also prefer to switch to PM from z, i.e.,
BRj(z j) = PM. (See Figure 1(b).)
Proof. Let p = peq(z). We have zi = zj = PM.
Consider joint actions z0 = (z j ;RM), z00 = (z i;RM)
with market prices p0 and p00. The utility of rm j in the
joint action z is uj(z) = p(p   j)=bj , and the utility of
rm j in the joint action z0 is uj(z0) = (p0   cj)2=bj .
The utilities of rm i are ui(z) = p(p   ci)=bi and
ui(z
00) = (p00   ci)2=bi, respectively.
i j
j j
z = **** RM **** RM ****
# #
PM (= PM
(a)
i j
j j
z = **** PM **** PM ****
# #
RM =) RM
(b)
Figure 1: Consider joint action z with rms i, j such
that ci > cj . Figure 1(a) corresponds to Lemma 3.4,
Figure 1(b) corresponds to Lemma 3.5.
By assumption, i prefers RM, so ui(z) < ui(z
0).
Assume by way of contradiction that rm j prefers PM,
i.e.,
(3.12) (p  cj)2 > p0(p0   cj) :
We will show that in this case rm i would also prefer
PM, i.e.,
(3.13) (p  ci)2 > p00(p00   ci) :
For xed p and p00, again dene f(r) = (p r)2 p0(p0 
r). Rearranging equation (3.12), we get f(cj) > 0. We
will show that f(r) is an increasing function in range
r > cj . Given that, since f(cj) > 0 and ci > cj , we can
conclude f(ci) > 0, and thus (p  ci)2 > p0(p0   ci).
We now show that f is increasing in the desired
range. The derivative f 0(r) = 2(r p)+p0  2cj 2p+p0.
Using Lemma 3.2, we have p  p0 + cj1+n0 . According
to Lemma 3.3, since rm j prefers PM, we have cj >
p0(1  1n02 ). Therefore,
f 0(r)  2cj   2p0   2 cj
1 + n0
+ p0
 2cj
n0 + 1
(n0 + 1  1)  p0
 2p0 (n
0   1)(n0 + 1)
n02
n0
n0 + 1
  p0
 p0 2n
0   2
n0
  p0
 p0 2n
0   2  n0
n0
 p0n
0   2
n0
;
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and therefore f(r) is a non-decreasing function for
n0  2.
We have established that, assuming rm j prefers
PM, then (p  ci)2 > p0(p0   ci).
We now will argue, similar to Observation 3.1, that
p0  p00. One can view the cost change of rm i in
two stages. In the rst stage the cost decrease by cj ,
thus setting price p0 in the system (since utility of j is
positive at p0, we have cj  p0, therefore j produces at
p0). In the second stage, rm i decreases the price by
the remaining ci cj . Since the price is monotone in the
cost, we get p0  p00. Therefore (p  ci)2 > p00(p00   ci),
contradicting our assumption that i prefers RM.
We now use the above lemmas to show that certain
sequences of joint actions cannot be part of any best
response sequence.
Lemma 3.6. Consider joint action z with zi = PM,
zj = RM and ci > cj. In addition, consider the fol-
lowing joint actions: z0 = (z i;RM) , z00 = (z0 j ;PM).
Then the sequence of joint actions z, followed by z0, fol-
lowed by z00 cannot be a best response sequence. (See
Figure 2(a).)
Proof. If z00 is a best response to z0, then uj(z00) >
uj(z
0). From Lemma 3.4 it follows that ui(z0) > ui(z)
should also hold, which contradicts the assumption that
z followed by z0 is a best response sequence.
Lemma 3.7. Consider joint action z with zi = PM,
zj = RM and ci > cj. In addition, consider the follow-
ing joint actions: z0 = (z j ;PM) and z00 = (z0 i;RM).
Then the sequence of joint actions z, followed by z0, fol-
lowed by z00 cannot be a best response sequence. (See
Figure 2(b)).
Proof. If z00 is a best response to z0, then ui(z00) >
ui(z
0). From Lemma 3.5 it follows that uj(z0) > uj(z)
should also hold, which contradicts the assumption that
z followed by z0 is a best response move.
The following lemma will play a central role in
showing that any best response dynamics converges to a
pure Nash equilibrium. The lemma shows that if there
is a sequence of rms switching from RM to PM, then
in the initial joint action, the lowest cost rm among
them would have a best response to switch from RM to
PM.
Lemma 3.8. Let z be a joint action with both rms i
and j playing RM. Let n be the number of producers at
z, such that n  3. Consider a best response move
of rm i followed by a best response move of j both
changing their strategy from RM to PM. If ci > cj,
PM is a best response action for j given z j.
i j
j j
z = **** PM **** RM ****
#
z' = **** RM **** RM ****
#
z" = **** PM **** PM ****
(a)
i j
j j
z = **** PM **** RM ****
#
z' = **** PM **** PM ****
#
z" = **** RM **** RM ****
(b)
Figure 2: Impossible series of best response moves with
rms i, j such that ci > cj . Figure 2(a) corresponds to
Lemma 3.6; Figure 2(b) corresponds to Lemma 3.7.
Proof. Consider joint actions z^ = (z j ;PM), z =
(z i;PM), and joint action z that dier from z by
actions of both rms i and j, i.e., z i; j = z i; j and
zi = zj = PM. Let p, p^, p and p be market prices, and
let number of producers be n, n^, n and n, respectively.
By the assumption of the lemma we have n  3. If
cj > p, then rm j's utility uj(z) < 0, thus it prefers
z^ where its utility is non-negative. For the rest of this
lemma we consider cj < p.
By the assumption of the lemma, j prefers z to z.
Using Lemma 3.3 we have: cj  p(1   1n2 ). Assume j
prefers z to z^. Using Lemma 3.3 we have: j  p(1  1n^2 ).
Combining these together, we have
(3.14) p(1  1
n2
)  cj  p(1  1
n^2
):
According to Lemma 3.1 we have p > p. For
inequality (3.14) to hold, we need
1  1
n2
< 1  1
n^2
;
n < n^:
We can have n < n^ only if ci > p and i stops
producing when it changes from RM in z to PM in z.
From Observation 3.1 we have p > p^, therefore
PM(z^) n fjg  PM(z). Clearly,
RM(z) = RM(z^) [ fjg = RM(z) [ fig :
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Hence, n^  n+ 1. Combining together, we get
n < n^  n+ 1;
which holds only for n^ = n + 1, therefore PM(z^) =
PM(z)[ fjg. We also have jPM(z)j   jPM(z)j = n^  n.
In addition, each rm i that produces at z and not in z
has production cost ci  p. Using the above, we get
p =
1 +
P
y2PM(z) cy
1 + n
<
1 +
P
y2PM(z) cy
1 + n^
=
1 +
P
y2PM(z) cy
n^
n^
1 + n^
= p
n^
1 + n^
;
Therefore,
p
p
<
n^
1 + n^
:
Using Inequality (3.14) we obtain
p(1  1
n2
)  p(1  1
n^2
);
p
(n2   1)
n2
 p n^
1 + n^
(n^2   1)
n^2
;
(n2   1)
n2
 (n^  1)
n^
;
1  1
n2
 1  1
n^
;
n2  n^:
Since, n^ = n + 1, we have (n^   1)2  n^, that
holds only for n^  2. Since n  n^ it contradicts the
assumption of the lemma that n  3.
The following theorem establishes that any se-
quence of best response moves converges to a pure Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. Any sequence of best response moves in
the PM=RM game converges to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that the game does not converge to
Nash equilibrium, so there is a sequence of best response
moves that cycles. Consider rm j with highest cost in
the cycle. Let P be the maximal chain of RM ! PM
moves that includes j.
Consider P of length at most 2. If j is the rst best
response move of P , then it contradicts to Lemma 3.6
(Figure 2(a)). If j is the last best response move of P ,
then it contradicts to Lemma 3.7 (Figure 2(b)).
We are left with P of size at least 3. Let z be a
joint action in the beginning of P . Applying Lemma
3.8 recursively, we get that BRj(z j) = PM. Let i be
the rm that made the best response move before P (it
has to be BRi(z i) = RM). Using Lemma 3.6 we arrive
at the contradiction that a cycle exists.
3.3 Best Response Dynamics Converge to Nash
Equilibrium Consider a joint action z in the PM=RM
game. If z is not a Nash equilibrium then at least
one of the rms prefers to switch its strategy. We will
show that a particular order of changing strategies leads
quickly to a Nash equilibrium.
To do this, let us dene BRF (z) to be the set of
rms that prefer to switch strategy: BRF (z) = fi j zi =2
BRi(z i)g. Intuitively, among the rms in PM(z), the
one with the lowest production cost is most likely to
prefer to switch strategy. Similarly, among the rms
in RM(z), the one with the maximum production cost
is most likely to switch strategy. We will consider
the dynamics that take advantage of this intuition.
Let us dene minPM(z) to be the rm with minimum
production cost among rms in PM(z) and maxRM(z)
to be the rm with maximum production cost among
rms in RM(z).
Consider the following natural best response dy-
namics:
While BRF (z) 6= ;, perform one of the following
actions
1. If minPM(z) 2 BRF(z), rm minPM(z) changes
its strategy.
2. If maxRM(z) 2 BRF(z), rm maxRM(z)
changes its strategy.
In the proof of the following lemma, we show that if
BRF (z) 6= ; then one of the actions is applicable.
Lemma 3.9. The above procedure converges to a Nash
equilibrium in at most 2m steps.
Proof. According to Lemma 3.5, if minPM(z) =2
BRF(z) then no rm PM(z) is in BRF(z). Similarly
if rm maxRM(z) =2 BRF(z), then no rm in RM(z)
is in BRF(z). Therefore, one of the two steps can be
always performed while BRF(z) 6= ;.
If we order the rms in decreasing order according
to their production cost, the current joint action is a
vector in fPM;RMgm. The procedure either replaces
the rightmost PM or the leftmost RM. Furthermore,
the most recent action cannot be undone immediately
(otherwise it wouldn't be a best response).
The claim is that the procedure terminates in at
most 2m steps. To see this, observe that at the
beginning the procedure changes the leftmost RM or the
rightmost PM until the vector consists of a sequence of
PM's followed by a sequence of RM's (or reaches Nash
Equilibrium in less than m steps). From that point on,
all the PM's precede the RM's in the current vector. It
follows that it takes at most m steps to reach the point
where the PM's precede the RM's and at most m more
steps to reach the nal vector.
Starting from a joint action in which all rms play
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PM, the above dynamics will converge in at most 2m
steps to a Nash equilibrium (in fact, the proof shows
that only m steps suce). It follows that
Corollary 3.1. There is a polynomial time compu-
tation to nd some Nash equilibrium of the PM=RM
game.
One might mistakenly assume that in all of the Nash
equilibria, low production cost rms play RM and high
production cost rms play PM. The following shows
that this is false:
Example. Consider two rms that have costs 0.30 and
0.28. It is straightforward to see that (RM;PM) is
a Nash equilibrium (and also (PM;RM) is an equilib-
rium).
4 Comparison of the PM=RM game and
Cournot competition
In this section we compare the outcome of the PM=RM
game versus the myopic Cournot competition. We start
by comparing the prices. For simplicity we assume that
bi = 1.
Assume z is a pure Nash equilibrium of the PM=RM
game, where k rms are producing. Since this is an
equilibrium, all other rms that select PM do not
produce and have zero utility. Any producing rm
i 2 M has production cost ci < p(z), and any rm
which has ci < p(z) is producing.
Consider the Cournot competition price, which is
equivalent to having all rms play PM. In this case, we
can think of computing the price in two steps: rst, we
let the rms that selected RM switch to PM, and then
we let any rm that was not producing before (since
its cost was higher than p(z)) produce. After the rst
stage, the price is at least the original price, and at most
p0  1 + kp(z)
1 + k
= p(z) +
1  p(z)
1 + k
:
After the second step, since we are adding rms with
production cost ci 2 [p(z); p0], the price can only go
down (but remains above the initial price of p(z)). We
can also lower bound p(z), since clearly p(z)  1k+1 .
We can now bound the dierence between the
Cournot competition price, pc, and the PM=RM game
price, as follows:
1  pc
p(z)
 p
0
p(z)
= 1 +
1  p(z)
p(z)(1 + k)
= 1 +
1
p(z)(1 + k)
  1
(1 + k)
 2  1
1 + k
 2  1
1 + n
;
(4.15)
where the rst inequality uses the fact that p(z)  1k+1 .
We can also show that the above bound is almost
tight. Consider the case of symmetric rms with pro-
duction cost c = 1n   1n2 . The pure Nash equilibrium in
this case is all the rms selecting RM (see Section x 5.2).
The Cournot competition price is 1+nc1+n =
2  1n
1+n while
when all the rms select RM, which is the pure Nash
equilibrium, the price is 11+n . In this case the ratio
between the prices is 2   1n . We have established the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Let pc be the Cournot competition price
and ppr be the PM=RM game price. Then,
1  pc
ppr
 2  1
1 + n
;
and there is a case where pcppr = 2  1n .
In our setting the price p denes the total produc-
tion, since
P
i2M xi = 1 p. Therefore the total revenue
(of all rms) is p(1   p) when the price is p. Since the
price in the PM=RM game is at least half the price of
the Cournot competition, the total revenue is at least
half. (Note that the produced amount increases while
the price decreases.)
We now can compare the utility of the rms in
the two settings. We will show that the utility can
be dramatically dierent. Consider again the case of
symmetric rms with production cost c = 1n   1n2 . The
utility of each rm in the Cournot competition is
2  1n
1 + n
  1
n
+
1
n2
2
=
2n2   n  n(n+ 1) + (n+ 1)
n2(1 + n)
2
=
(
1
n2
) :
(4.16)
The utility of each rm in the PM=RM game is
1
1 + n
  1
n
+
1
n2

1
1 + n
=
n2   n(1 + n) + (1 + n)
n2(1 + n)

1
1 + n
=
(
1
n4
):
(4.17)
This implies that the ratio between the utilities can be
as large as n2. Since all the utilities are identical, the
same ratio holds for the sum of the utilities.
Theorem 4.2. There is a case where the sum of the
utilities in the Cournot competition is a factor of (n2)
larger than the sum of the utilities in the PM=RM game.
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5 Instances of special interest for the PM=RM
Game
In this section we consider two cases: when only two
rms compete in the market and when all rms have
the same cost.
5.1 PM=RM game: Two rms, complete charac-
terization In this section we give a complete charac-
terization of all the pure Nash equilibria for the case of
two rms. The characterization is divided to four cases,
depending on the rms' costs, compared to 1=2.
Theorem 5.1. For two rms in the PM=RM game,
there is always at least one pure Nash equilibrium, and
the characterization when a joint action is a pure Nash
equilibrium is as follows:
(RM,RM) when c1 <
1
4 and c2 <
1
4 .
(PM,RM) when either: 1. c1 2 [ 14 ; 12 ] and c2 < 1+c14 ,
or 2. c1 <
3
2
p
1  2c2   (1  2c2) and c2  12 .
(RM,PM) when either: 1. c1 <
1+c2
4 and c2 2 [ 14 ; 12 ],
or 2. c1  12 and c2 < 32
p
1  2c1   (1  2c1).
(PM,PM) when one of the cases below holds:
1. c1 2 [ 1+c24 ; 12 ] and c2 2 [ 1+c14 ; 12 ].
2. c1  12 and c2 2 [ 32
p
1  2c1  (1  2c1); 1+c12 ].
3. c1 2 [ 32
p
1  2c2  (1  2c2); 1+c22 ] and c2  12 .
4. c1 >
1
2 , and c2 >
1
2 .
Proof. We consider four cases, depending on the rms'
costs, compared to 1=2.
Case 1 fc1  1=2 and c2  1=2g: This is the most
interesting case, in which the two rms are producing, as
we will see later. We rst dene the price as a function
of the action of the rms.5
RM PM
RM 13
1+c2
3
PM 1+c13
1+c1+c2
3
Next we derive the production level xi(z), at each
joint action.
RM PM
RM

1
3b1
; 13b2
 
1+c2
3b1
; 1 2c23b2

PM

1 2c1
3b1
; 1+c13b2
 
1+c2 2c1
3b1
; 1+c1 2c23b2

Each entry of the production level matrix is non-
negative for ci  1=2. Therefore, rm i that plays PM
5In all matrices that we use, row rm is rm 1 and column
rm is rm 2.
will produce. For two rms we have the following payo
matrix:
RM PM
RM
 1
3b1
( 13   c1),
1
3b2
( 13   c2)
 
( 1+c23   c1) 1+c23b1 ,
( 1 2c23 )
2 1
b2

PM

( 1 2c13 )
2 1
b1
,
( 1+c13   c2) 1+c13b2
 
( 1+c2 2c13 )
2 1
b1
,
( 1+c1 2c23 )
2 1
b2

To compute the pure Nash equilibria, we compute
the preference of the rms. We start with rm 1.
 Firm 1 prefers (PM;RM) to (RM;RM) when
1
3b1
( 13   c1) < ( 1 2c13 )2 1b1 , which holds for c1 > 14 .
 Firm 1 prefers (PM;PM) to (RM;PM) when
( 1+c23   c1) 1+c23b1 < ( 1+c2 2c13 )2 1b1 , which holds for
c1 >
1+c2
4 .
 Firm 2 prefers (RM;PM) to (RM;RM) for c2 > 14 .
 Firm 2 prefers (PM;PM) to (RM;PM) for c2 >
1+c1
4 .
The conditions for each joint actions to be a pure
Nash equilibrium, are as follows:
RM PM
RM c1 <
1
4 ; c2 <
1
4 c1 <
1+c2
4 ; c2 >
1
4
PM c1 >
1
4 ; c2 <
1+c1
4 c1 >
1+c2
4 ; c2 >
1+c1
4
Case 2 fc1 > 12 and c2 > 12g: If both rms select RM
then the price is 1=3 and they both have negative utility.
Assume rm 1 selects RM. If rm 2 selects PM then the
price is p = 1+c23 . Since c2 > 1=2, then c2 > p, and rm
2 is not producing. If the rm 2 selects PM and is not
producing then the price is 1=2 < c1, thus rm 1 has
negative utility. Therefore, in this case both rms have
PM as a dominating action.
Case 3 fc1  12 and c2 > 12g: If rm 2 selects RM, then
the price is at most 1+c13  12 . Therefore, in this case,
action PM will be a strictly dominating action for rm
2.
Consider joint action (RM;PM). We have produc-
tion level x2 =
1+c2
3   c2 < 0, thus rm 2 is not produc-
ing. For joint action (PM;PM), rm 1 always produces
(production level x1  min f 1+c1+c23 ; 1+c12 g   c1 > 0, so
we have rm 2 produces if p = 1+c1+c23 > c2.
In the case that c2 >
1+c1
2 rm 1 produces alone,
so her dominating action is PM, and her utility is
( 1 c12 )
2 1
b1
.
For c2 <
1+c1
2 , since rm 2 dominating action is
1003 Copyright © SIAM.
Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
Figure 3: Characterization of two rms' pure Nash
Equilibria
PM, the payo values are:
u1(RM;PM) =

1
2
  c1

1
2b1
;
u2(PM;PM) =

1 + c2   2c1
3
2
1
b1
:
Firm 1 will prefer action PM if
c2 2 [ 3
2
p
1  2c1   (1  2c1); 1 + c1
2
] ;
otherwise, when
c2 <
3
2
p
1  2c1   (1  2c1) ;
rm 1 prefers RM.
Case 4 fc1 > 12 and c2  12g: Similar to the previous
case, rm 1 will select PM. Firm 2 will prefer action PM
if c1 2 [ 32
p
1  2c2   (1   2c2); 1+c22 ]; otherwise, when
c1 <
3
2
p
1  2c2   (1  2c2), rm 2 prefers RM.
In each of the four regions, we showed that for any
value of the production cost, there exists a pure Nash
equilibrium. (For some values there exist two pure Nash
equilibria; see Example 3.3.) A diagram of the pure
Nash equilibria appears in Figure 3.
5.2 Symmetric rms We consider the case of m
symmetric rms with cost c for each, playing the
PM=RM game. Namely, each rm selects an action
in fRM;PMg. The rms that select the action RM
will act as revenue maximizers (behave as though their
production cost is zero). The rms that select PM
will act as prot maximizers. Note that since this is
a symmetric case, at equilibrium all the rms will be
producing, i.e., n = m. We assume that for each rm i,
bi = 1.
Suppose that k rms select the action PM and
n   k rms select the action RM. In this case the
price is pk = 1+kcn+1 . Firms that select PM will produce
xkp = p
k c = 1 (n+1 k)cn+1 , and rms that will select RM
will produce xkr = p
k = 1+kcn+1 . The utility of rms that
select PM is
ukp = x
k
p(p
k   c) = (1  (n+ 1  k)c
n+ 1
)2 ;
while the utility of rms that select RM will be
ukr = x
k
r (p
k   c) = 1 + kc
n+ 1
(
1  (n+ 1  k)c
n+ 1
) :
We will now compute for which costs c is it a Nash
equilibrium to have k rms selecting PM and n k rms
selecting RM.
Theorem 5.2. Let ak = n 1n(n k)+k+n 1 for k 2 [1; n],
a0 = 0, bk = n 1n(n k)+k for k 2 [0; n  1] and bn = 1. If
the players' cost c 2 [ak; bk] then there is a pure Nash
equilibrium with k rms selecting PM and n   k rms
selecting RM.
Proof. If a rm selecting RM deviates to PM (k  n 1),
then its new utility would be uk+1p = (
1 (n k)c
n+1 )
2.
Action RM will be a best response if
1 + kc
n+ 1

1  (n+ 1  k)c
n+ 1



1  (n  k)c
n+ 1
2
) (1 + kc)(1  (n+ 1  k)c)  (1  (n  k)c)2
) 1  (n+ 1)c+ 2kc  k(n+ 1  k)c2 
1  2(n  k)c+ (n  k)2c2
) (n  1)c  ((n  k)2 + k(n+ 1  k))c2
) n  1
n(n  k) + k  c
If a rm selecting PM deviates to RM (k  1), then
its new utility would be
uk 1r =
1 + (k   1)c
n+ 1
(
1  (n+ 2  k)c
n+ 1
) :
Action PM will be a best response if
1  (n+ 1  k)c
n+ 1
2

1 + (k   1)c
n+ 1

1  (n+ 2  k)c
n+ 1

) (1  (n+ 1  k)c)2 
(1 + (k   1)c)(1  (n+ 2  k)c)
) 1  2(n+ 1  k)c+ (n+ 1  k)2c2 
1  (n  2k + 3)c  (k   1)(n+ 2  k)c2
) ((n+ 1  k)2 + (k   1)(n+ 2  k))c2 
(n  1)c
) (n(n  k) + k + n  1)c  (n  1)
) c  n  1
n(n  k) + k + n  1
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This implies that for ck 2 [ak; bk] there is a pure
Nash equilibrium with k rms selecting PM and n   k
rms selecting RM, where ak = n 1n(n k)+k+n 1 for
k 2 [1; n] and bk = n 1n(n k)+k for k 2 [0; n   1]. Note
that ak = bk 1, and let a0 = 0 and bn = 1. This covers
the entire range of symmetric production costs.
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